Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Debugging a Hard Lockup with RTAI

I have an embedded box running Linux 2.6.29/RTAI/RTnet. I hacked the e1000e driver for use with RTnet and also I eviscerated its ISR as (due to PCI limitations) its IRQ sits on the same line as an FGPA IRQ my client is using.

The FPGA RTAI ISR is calling the old e1000e ISR by
a) signalling a semaphore which
b) wakes an RTAI tasks which
c) calls the e1000e ISR.

Some times when using this hacked driver the machine would lock up hard and we had no clue.

I found out about the "nmi_watchdog=1" kernel option, recompiled the kernel with IO-APIC (fortunately this target has an APIC) and observed. After 5 seconds the answer came on a silver platter:

BUG: NMI Watchdog detected LOCKUP on CPU0, ip f8a4d620
Pid: 990, comm: sh Tainted: P (2.6.29.6-apic-ipipe #37)
EIP: 0060:[<f8a4d620>] EFLAGS: 00000046 CPU: 0
EIP is at rt_sem_signal+0xf4/0x3d6 [rtai_sched]
EAX: 3fffffff EBX: 00000010 ECX: f8a5aae0 EDX: 3fffffff
ESI: f8a640e0 EDI: f8a63c60 EBP: f7b5be44 ESP: f7b5be30
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
Process sh (pid: 990, ti=f7b5a000 task=f78f2330 task.ti=f7b5a000)
I-pipe domain Linux
Stack:
00000246 00000000 00000010 00000000 00000003 f7b5be58 f8a630d5 f8a640e0
00000011 fa63e4c4 f7b5be70 f8e9b694 000001b8 c0297874 00000000 f7819580
f7b5be88 c01dc543 f74e0748 00000000 f781de40 00000000 f7b5bea8 c01537d1
Call Trace:
[<f8a630d5>] ? irqregistrar_switch_irq+0x59/0x61 [irqregistrar]
[<f8e9b694>] ? proprietarydriver_open+0x3b0/0x3ce [proprietarymodule]
[<c01dc543>] ? misc_open+0xf4/0x150
[<c01537d1>] ? chrdev_open+0xef/0x106
[<c015045c>] ? __dentry_open+0xfe/0x1eb
[<c01505e2>] ? nameidata_to_filp+0x2b/0x42
[<c01536e2>] ? chrdev_open+0x0/0x106
[<c015a146>] ? do_filp_open+0x337/0x648
[<c013595b>] ? __ipipe_restore_root+0x16/0x18
[<c014f060>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x79/0xb0
[<c0160a26>] ? alloc_fd+0x4c/0xb2
[<c0150258>] ? do_sys_open+0x46/0xed
[<c0150341>] ? sys_open+0x1e/0x26
[<c0102c07>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Code: 0f 84 16 01 00 00 8b 47 0c 83 e0 f3 89 47 0c 8b 47 0c 48 0f 85 03 01 00 00 8b 87 04 04 00 00 85 c0 74 42 8b 0d f4 ad a5 f8 eb 0d <8b> 89 14 03 00 00 8b 41 1c 85 c0 78 0a 8b 57 1c 8b 41 1c 39 c2
---[ end trace 4a04e77971ee2cfd ]---
Weird: my code was actually calling rt_mutex_unlock but that's aliased in RTAI to rt_sem_signal.

Decoding this was a bit of a puzzle as ksymoops is deprecated for 2.6 The offending instruction was
mov 0x314(%ecx),%ecx
which after a bit of disassembly turned out to be in enq_ready_task() whose code is a bit counterintuitive (it looks at the semaphore's task queue).

Divining that my semaphore may be borked I looked at the code (a kernel module) that I wrote 2 years ago and it read
SEM pollSem;
which should be always initalised to zero at insmod time it just that it isn't.

So I changed the module_init code to
memset(&pollSem,0,sizeof(&pollSem));
rt_typed_sem_init(&pollSem, 1, RES_SEM | PRIO_Q);
which seems to have done the trick.


Apr 10 update: Nope, did not work. The mutex was shared between RTAI and Linux tasks and releasing it from Linux confused the RTAI code -- maybe they've only expected RTAI mutexes to be used solely in RTAI context. My problem was that I was trying to protect a resource (a callback registry) that was changed from Linux but used from RTAI. In the end I used it lockless in RTAI context (Linux is not running when RTAI is executing) and protect it with cli/sti in Linux context when it is manipulated to make sure RTAI does not barge in.

I would like to commend the RTAI people for the utter lack of documentation on mutexes or anything else and sparse sample code that they abundantly put forward for people to learn their wares. If it was hard to write then it must be hard to use seems to be their groupthink.

-ulianov